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Abstract
We describe an efficient quantum algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in semigroups
using Shor’s algorithms for period finding and discrete log as subroutines. Thus proposed
cryptosystems based on the presumed hardness of discrete logarithms in semigroups are insecure
against quantum attacks. In contrast, we show that some generalizations of the discrete log
problem are hard in semigroups despite being easy in groups. We relate a shifted version of the
discrete log problem in semigroups to the dihedral hidden subgroup problem, and we show that
the constructive membership problem with respect to k ≥ 2 generators in a black-box abelian
semigroup of order N requires Θ˜(N
1
2
−
1
2k ) quantum queries.
1 Introduction
The presumed difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in groups is a common cryptographic
assumption. For example, such an assumption underlies Diffie-Hellman key exchange, ElGamal
encryption, and most elliptic curve cryptography. While such cryptosystems may be secure against
classical computers, Shor showed that quantum computers can efficiently compute discrete loga-
rithms [18]. Shor originally described an algorithm for computing discrete logs in multiplicative
groups of integers, but it is well known that his approach efficiently computes discrete logs in any
finite group, provided only that group elements have a unique encoding and that group operations
can be performed efficiently.
Here we consider the closely related problem of computing discrete logarithms in finite semi-
groups. A semigroup is simply a set equipped with an associative binary operation. In particular,
a semigroup need not have inverses (and also need not have an identity element). We suppose
that the semigroup elements have a unique encoding and that we are able to perform semigroup
operations efficiently. In the discrete log problem for a semigroup S, we are given two elements
x, g ∈ S and are asked to find the smallest a ∈ N := {1, 2, . . .} such that ga = x (or to determine
that no such a exists). We write a = logg x.
At first glance, it may be unclear how a quantum computer could compute discrete logs in
semigroups. Shor’s discrete log algorithm relies crucially on the function (a, b) 7→ gax−b, but x−b
is not defined in a semigroup. In fact, hardness of the semigroup discrete logarithm problem has
been proposed as a cryptographic assumption that might be secure against quantum computers
[10]. The particular scheme described in [10], based on matrix semigroups, has been broken by a
quantum attack [15]. However, the algorithm of [15] uses a reduction from discrete logs in matrix
groups to to discrete logs in finite fields [13], so it does not apply to general semigroups.
Here we point out that in fact quantum computers can efficiently compute discrete logs in any
finite semigroup. Our approach is a straightforward application of known quantum tools. The
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Figure 1: The semigroup generated by g.
structure of the semigroup generated by g can be efficiently determined using the ability of a
quantum computer to detect periodicity, as shown in Section 2. Once this structure is known, an
algorithm to compute discrete logs follows easily, as explained in Section 3.
On the other hand, some problems for semigroups are considerably harder than for groups. In
Section 4, we consider a shifted version of the discrete log problem in semigroups, namely solving
the equation x = yga for a. This problem appears comparably difficult to the dihedral hidden
subgroup problem, even though the corresponding problem in a group can be solved efficiently
by computing a discrete log. In Section 5, we consider the problem of writing a given semigroup
element as a product of k ≥ 2 given generators of a black-box abelian semigroup. This problem
can also be solved efficiently in groups, whereas the semigroup version is provably hard, requiring
Ω(N
1
2
− 1
2k ) quantum queries. In fact, this bound is optimal up to logarithmic factors, as we show
using the algorithm for the shifted discrete log problem.
After posting a preprint of this work, we learned of independent related work by Banin and
Tsaban, who showed that the semigroup discrete log problem can be solved efficiently using an
oracle for the discrete log problem in a cyclic group [2]. In particular, this implies a fast quantum
algorithm for semigroup discrete log.
2 Finding the period and index of a semigroup element
Given a finite semigroup S, fix some element g ∈ S. The value
t := min{j ∈ N : gj = gk for some k ∈ j + N}
is called the index of g. The index exists since S is finite. The value
r := min{j ∈ N : gt = gt+j}
is called the period of g. These definitions are illustrated in Figure 1. If j ≥ t, we say that gj is in
the cycle of g; if j < t, we say that gj is in the tail of g.
Suppose we are given an upper bound t+ r ≤ N on the order of g. For a trivial upper bound,
we could take N to be the order of the semigroup. We consider an algorithm to be efficient if it
runs in time poly(logN). We claim that there is an efficient algorithm to compute t and r.
Lemma 1. Given a black-box semigroup S and an element g ∈ S, there is an efficient quantum
algorithm to determine the index and the period of g.
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Proof. First we find the period, as follows. Create the state 1√
M
∑M
j=1 |j〉|gj〉 for some sufficiently
large M (it suffices to take M > N2 + N). Note that we can compute gj efficiently even for
exponentially large j using repeated squaring, so this state can be made in polynomial time. Next,
we discard the second register. To understand what happens when we do this, suppose we measure
the second register. If we obtain an element in the tail of g, then the first register is left in a
computational basis state, which is useless. However, with probability at least (M − t + 1)/M ≥
1−N/M , we obtain an element in the cycle of g, and we are left with an r-periodic state
1√
L
L−1∑
j=0
|x0 + jr〉
for some unknown x0 ∈ {t, t + 1, . . . , t + r − 1}, where L is either ⌊(M − t)/r⌋ or ⌈(M − t)/r⌉
(depending on the value of x0). This is precisely the type of state that appears in Shor’s period-
finding algorithm. After Fourier transforming this state over ZM and measuring, we obtain the
outcome k ∈ ZM with probability
Pr(k) =
sin2(πkrLM )
LM sin2(πkrM )
.
A simple calculation (see for example [4, Algorithm 5]) shows that the probability of obtaining a
closest integer to one of the r integer multiples of M/r is at least 4/π2. By efficient classical post-
processing using continued fractions, we can recover r from such values with constant probability
[18]. Since we are in the cycle of g with overwhelming probability, the overall procedure succeeds
with constant probability (which could be boosted by standard techniques).
Given the period of g, we can find its index by an efficient classical procedure. Observe that we
can efficiently decide whether a given element gj is in the tail or the cycle of g: simply compute gr
by repeated squaring and multiply by gj to compute gj+r. If gj+r = gj , then gj is in the cycle of
g; otherwise it is in the tail of g. Let
γ(gj) :=
{
1 if gj+r = gj (i.e., gj is in the cycle of g)
0 otherwise (i.e., gj is in the tail of g).
The value of t is precisely the index of the first 1 in the list (γ(g), γ(g2), . . . , γ(gN )). This list
consists of t− 1 zeros followed by N − t+1 ones, so we can find t in O(logN) iterations by binary
search.
3 Computing discrete logs
We now show how to efficiently compute discrete logarithms in semigroups on a quantum computer.
Theorem 1. Given x, g ∈ S, there is an efficient quantum algorithm to compute logg x.
Proof. First, we use Lemma 1 to compute the index t and the period r of g. Then we determine
whether x is in the tail or the cycle of g. As described in the proof of Lemma 1, this can be done
efficiently by determining whether xgr = x.
If x is in the tail of g, then we compute p, the smallest positive integer such that γ(xgp) = 1. This
can be done efficiently by using binary search to find the first 1 in the list (γ(xg), γ(xg2), . . . , γ(xgm)).
Then we can compute logg x = t− p.
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On the other hand, suppose x is in the cycle of g. Then we use the well-known fact (see for
example [8]) that C := {gt+j : j ∈ Zr} is a group with identity element gt+s where s = −t mod r.
In fact C is a cyclic group generated by gt+s+1; in particular, for j ≥ t we have gt+s+1gj = gj+1.
Now we use Shor’s discrete log algorithm to compute loggt+s+1 x. While we cannot easily compute
the inverse of x in C, we know that the inverse of gt+s+1 is gt+s+r−1, so we can compute the hiding
function f : Zr × Zr → C with f(a, b) = xag(t+s+r−1)b = xa(gt+s+1)−b, which suffices to efficiently
compute discrete logs in C. Thus we can compute logg x = t+ [(s+ loggt+s+1 x) mod r].
4 A shifted version of discrete log
While the discrete log problem is no harder in semigroups than in groups, some problems that have
efficient quantum algorithms in groups are more difficult in semigroups. In this section, we discuss a
shifted version of the discrete log problem that appears to be closely related to the dihedral hidden
subgroup problem.
The shifted discrete log problem is as follows: given x, y, g ∈ S, find some a ∈ N such that
x = yga. If S is a group, then this problem reduces to the ordinary discrete log problem, since it
suffices to find a ∈ N such that ga = y−1x. However, if S is a semigroup, then the best quantum
algorithm we are aware of is the following.
Lemma 2. Given a black-box semigroup S and elements x, y, g ∈ S, there is a quantum algorithm
to find a ∈ N such that x = yga in time 2O(
√
log |S|). Furthermore, there is an algorithm using only
poly(log |S|) quantum queries.
Proof. Similarly to j 7→ gj , the function j 7→ ygj has index
t˜ := min{j ∈ N : ygj = ygk for some k ∈ j + N}
and period
r˜ := min{j ∈ N : ygt˜ = gt˜+j};
we say that ygj is in the cycle if j ≥ t˜ and in the tail if j < t˜. The period r˜ and the index t˜ can be
computed efficiently along the same lines as described in Section 2.
The case where x is in the tail can be treated as in Section 3. If x is in the cycle, so that x = ygt˜+ℓ
for some nonnegative integer ℓ, then we must solve a constructive orbit membership problem for
a permutation action of the group Zr˜ on the set of elements of the form yg
t˜+j . Specifically, the
action of j′ ∈ Zr˜ is multiplication by gj′ and we must find the element ℓ ∈ Zr˜ transporting ygt˜
to x. To this end we consider the efficiently computable function f : Z2 ⋉ Zr˜ → S with f(0, j) =
ygt˜+j and f(1, j) = xgj . The function f(0, j) is injective since it has period r˜. Furthermore,
f(1, j) = xgj = ygt˜+ℓ+j = f(0, j + ℓ), i.e., f(1, j) is a shift of f(0, j) by ℓ. Therefore, f hides the
subgroup 〈(1, ℓ)〉 of the dihedral group Z2⋉Zr˜ (i.e., it is constant on the cosets of this subgroup and
distinct on different cosets). It follows that the Kuperberg sieve [11] finds ℓ (and hence a = t˜+ ℓ)
in time 2O(
√
log r). Finally, since the dihedral hidden subgroup problem can be solved with only
polynomially many quantum queries to the hiding function [5], we can solve the shifted discrete log
problem in a black-box semigroup S with only poly(log |S|) queries.
The dihedral hidden subgroup problem (DHSP) is apparently hard. Despite considerable effort
(motivated by a close connection to lattice problems [16]), Kuperberg’s algorithm remains the best
known approach, and it is plausible that there might be no efficient quantum algorithm. Note
that the DHSP can be reduced to a quantum generalization of the constructive orbit membership
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problem, namely, orbit membership for a permutation action on pairwise orthogonal quantum states
[6, Proposition 2.2]. Thus, intuitively, a solution of the shift problem for a (classical) permutation
action (such as in the shifted discrete log problem) should exploit that the action is on classical
states, unless it also solves the DHSP.
In Section 5, we describe another variant of the discrete log problem that is even harder than
the shifted discrete log problem, requiring exponentially many queries. We also show that our lower
bound for that problem is nearly optimal using the algorithm of Lemma 2 as a subroutine.
5 Constructive semigroup membership
Given an abelian semigroup with generators g1, . . . , gk and an element x ∈ 〈g1, . . . , gk〉, the con-
structive membership problem asks us to find a1, . . . , ak ∈ N0 := {0, 1, 2, . . .} with a1+ · · ·+ ak ≥ 1
such that x = ga11 · · · gakk . The notation g0i simply indicates that no factor of gi is present, so solu-
tions with ai = 0 for some values of i are well defined even though the semigroup need not have an
identity element.
This natural generalization of the discrete log problem is easy for abelian groups (see for example
[9, Theorem 5]). In that case, let ri := |〈gi〉| for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, r := |〈g〉|, and L := Zr1 × · · · ×
Zrk × Zr. The values (r1, . . . , rk, r) can be computed efficiently by Shor’s order-finding algorithm
[18]. Now consider the function f : L → G defined by f(a1, . . . , ak, b) = ga11 · · · gakk x−b. This function
hides the subgroup H := {(x1, . . . , xk, x) ∈ L : gx11 · · · gxkk = gx} ≤ L, so generators of H can be
found in polynomial time [14]. To solve the constructive membership problem, it suffices to find
the solutions with x = 1 mod r. This corresponds to a system of linear Diophantine equations, so
it can be solved classically in polynomial time (see for example [17, Corollary 5.3b]).
Here we show that the constructive membership problem in semigroups is considerably harder.
Specifically, given a black-box semigroup S, we need exponentially many quantum queries (in
log |S|) to solve the constructive membership problem with respect to k ≥ 2 generators.
Theorem 2. Given a black-box semigroup S = 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 and an element x ∈ S, at least
Ω(|S| 12− 12k ) quantum queries are required to solve the constructive membership problem for x with
respect to g1, . . . , gk.
Proof. For any n ∈ N, consider the abelian semigroup
S = {ga11 · · · gakk : a1, . . . , ak ∈ N0, 1 ≤ a1 + · · ·+ ak ≤ n} ∪ {0}
with the following multiplication rules:
0(ga11 · · · gakk ) = 0
(ga11 · · · gakk )(gb11 · · · gbkk ) =
{
ga1+b11 · · · gak+bkk if a1 + · · ·+ ak + b1 + · · ·+ bk ≤ n
0 if a1 + · · ·+ ak + b1 + · · ·+ bk > n.
Let Σ := {(a1, . . . , ak−1) ∈ Nk−10 : a1 + · · · + ak−1 ≤ n}. We show that the problem of inverting a
black-box permutation π : Σ→ Σ (i.e., computing π−1(σ) for any fixed σ ∈ Σ given a black box for
π) reduces to constructive semigroup membership in a black-box version of S with respect to the
generators g1, . . . , gk. Since inverting a permutation of m points requires Ω(
√
m) quantum queries
[1], |Σ| = Θ(nk−1), and |S| = Θ(nk), this shows that constructive semigroup membership requires
Ω(
√
nk−1) = Ω(|S| 12− 12k ) queries.
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To construct the black-box semigroup, we specify an encoding
enc : S → {(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ Nk0 : 1 ≤ a1 + · · · + ak < n} ∪ Σ ∪ {0}
defined by
enc(ga11 · · · gakk ) := (a1, . . . , ak) if a1 + · · ·+ ak < n
enc(ga11 · · · gak−1k−1 g
n−a1−···−ak−1
k ) := π(a1, . . . , ak−1)
enc(0) := 0.
We can compute enc(gh) using at most one call to π given the encodings enc(g), enc(h) of any g, h ∈
S. Now suppose we can solve the constructive membership problem for some σ ∈ Σ with respect to
the generators g1, . . . , gk with encodings (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , (0, . . . , 0, 1). Then we can find the values
a1, . . . , ak−1 such that enc(ga11 · · · gak−1k−1 g
n−a1−···−ak−1
k ) = σ, so that (a1, . . . , ak−1) = π
−1(σ), thereby
inverting π.
In fact, for any fixed k, this lower bound is nearly tight.
Theorem 3. Given a black-box semigroup S = 〈g1, . . . , gk〉 and an element x ∈ S, there is a
quantum algorithm to solve the constructive membership problem for x with respect to g1, . . . , gk
in time |S| 12− 12k+o(1). Furthermore, there is an algorithm using only |S| 12− 12k poly(log |S|) quantum
queries.
To prove this, we use the following simple observation.
Lemma 3. Let S be a finite abelian semigroup and let x, g1, . . . , gk ∈ S. Let (a1, . . . , ak) be the
lexicographically first k-tuple from Nk0 such that x = g
a1
1 · · · gakk . Then (a1 + 1) · · · (ak + 1) ≤ |S|.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that (a1+1) · · · (ak+1) > |S|. Then, by the pigeonhole principle,
there must exist c1, . . . , ck, d1, . . . , dk ∈ N0 with ci, di ≤ ai (for all i = 1, . . . , k) such that gc11 · · · gckk =
gd11 · · · gdkk and (c1, . . . , ck) 6= (d1, . . . , dk). Suppose without loss of generality that (c1, . . . , ck) is
lexicographically smaller than (d1, . . . , dk). Let bi := ai+ ci− di for all i, and note that ai− di ≥ 0.
Thus ga11 · · · gakk = gd11 · · · gdkk ga1−d11 · · · gak−dkk and gb11 · · · gbkk = gc11 · · · gckk ga1−d11 · · · gak−dkk . This
implies gb11 · · · gbkk = x. Also, for the first index i with ci 6= di, we have ci < di. Therefore
(b1, . . . , bk) is lexicographically smaller than (a1, . . . , ak), a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemma 3, there is some j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that∏i 6=j(ai+1) ≤ |S|(k−1)/k.
To see this, note that
∏k
j=1
∏
i 6=j(ai + 1) =
(∏k
j=1(aj + 1)
)k−1 ≤ |S|k−1. Thus, for each j ∈
{1, . . . , k}, we perform a Grover search [7] over (a1, . . . , aj−1, aj+1, . . . , ak) ∈ Nk−1 with
∏
i 6=j(ai +
1) ≤ |S|(k−1)/k, where for each (k − 1)-tuple we use Lemma 2 (with y = ∏i 6=j gaii and g = gj)
to find aj such that x = g
a1
1 · · · gakk (or to exclude its existence). The running time of this pro-
cedure is k|S|k−12k +o(1) = |S| 12− 12k+o(1). Using the query-efficient (but not time-efficient) algorithm
for the dihedral hidden subgroup problem in place of Kuperberg’s algorithm, we require only
|S| 12− 12k poly(log |S|) queries.
While Theorem 2 shows that the constructive membership problem is provably hard in black-
box semigroups, the problem is also known to be NP-hard in explicit semigroups. In particular,
Beaudry proved NP-completeness of membership testing in abelian semigroups of transformations
of (small) finite sets [3].
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6 Discussion
We have considered quantum algorithms for the semigroup discrete log problem and some natural
generalizations thereof. While discrete logs can be computed efficiently by a quantum computer
even in semigroups, the shifted semigroup discrete log problem appears comparable in difficulty to
the dihedral hidden subgroup problem, and the constructive membership problem in a black-box
semigroup with respect to multiple generators is provably hard. Thus, while hardness of the dis-
crete log problem in semigroups is not a good assumption for quantum-resistant cryptography, one
might build quantum-resistant cryptosystems based on the presumed hardness of other problems
in semigroups.
Testing membership in abelian semigroups is related to a cryptographic problem known as the
semigroup action problem (SAP) [12]. Given an (abelian) semigroup S acting on a set M and two
elements x, y ∈ M , the SAP asks one to find an element s ∈ S such that x = sy. Constructive
membership testing in a monoid (i.e., a semigroup with an identity element, which can be adjoined
artificially if necessary) is an instance of SAP: consider S acting on itself by multiplication and let
y be the identity. (More precisely, to obtain a decomposition with respect to generators g1, . . . , gk,
consider the natural action of 〈g1〉 × · · · × 〈gk〉 on S.) On the other hand, the SAP over an abelian
semigroup can be reduced to membership of x in a subsemigroup generated by y and S of the abelian
semigroup S′ = S ∪M ∪ {0} with a semigroup operation that naturally extends the multiplication
of S and the action of S on M . In particular, the SAP for a cyclic semigroup action reduces to an
instance of the shifted discrete log problem discussed in Section 4.
A natural open question raised by our work is the quantum complexity of the shifted semigroup
discrete log problem: is this task indeed as hard as the DHSP, or is there a faster algorithm using
additional structure? In general, it might also be interesting to develop new quantum-resistant
cryptographic primitives based on hard semigroup problems.
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